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WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
II. CIvIL PROCEDURE
Chung v. Nana Development Co.: Rotten Reindeer Antlers
and Specific Jurisdiction in Contract Cases
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment limits the ability
of a court to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.,
Due process requires the nonresident defendant to have sufficient contacts
with the forum state for a state court to exercise in personam jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant.2 Before a federal court can assert in personam
I. U.S. CONST. AmEND. XIV. The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process. Id. In personam jurisdiction
is the power that a court has to render judgments against defendants. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714, 724 (1877). In contrast, in rem jurisdiction is the power a court has over a
defendant's interest in property. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 723-24. The United States Constitution
requires a court to have personal jurisdiction over a defendant before the court can render a
valid judgement. U.S. CONST. AmEND. XIV; Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 723-24; see World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980)(discussing due process limitations
and personal jurisdiction requirements). In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, the
United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether an Oklahoma court could exercise
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286,
291, 297-98. In World-Wide Volkswagen the plaintiff bought an allegedly defective automobile
in New York from a New York auto retailer and wholesaler. Id. at 288. The plaintiff was in
an automobile accident in Oklahoma. Id. The automobile accident led to the plaintiff's
hospitalization in Oklahoma. Id. After the plaintiff's hospitalization, the plaintiff filed suit
against the nonresident defendants. Id. The Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen stated
that the court should not subject a nonresident retailer or wholesaler to suit in a foreign state
based on an isolated occurrence resulting from the use of a nonresident defendant's product
in the foreign state. Id. at 295-99. The Court, however, maintained that a court reasonably
may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident manufacturer or distributor who intends to market
directly or indirectly products in the foreign market. Id. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the
nonresident defendant wholesaler distributed automobiles in New York, New Jersey, and
Connecticut. Id. at 298. The nonresident defendant retailer sold automobiles only in New
York. Id. The Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen, therefore, reasoned that the
nonresident defendants could not expect an Oklahoma court to subject the nonresident
defendant to suit in Oklahoma. Id. Thus, the Oklahoma court did not have personal jurisdiction
over the nonresident defendant. Id. at 298-99; see text accompanying notes 56-60 (discussing
International Shoe's prerequisites to asserting personal jurisdiction). See generally Developments
in the Law - State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 915 (1960)(discussing state
court's authority to hear claims against nonresident defendants).
2. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (establishing minimum
contact requirement to protect nonresident defendant's due process rights). In International
Shoe v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court effectively revised the standard that
the court had enunciated in Pennoyer v. Neff for determining personal jurisdiction. See
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (Supreme Court in International Shoe changed jurisdictional
requirement from physical presence requirement to minimum contacts requirement); see also
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877) (describing personal jurisdiction requirements). The
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jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the federal court must adhere to
the forum states's long arm statute.3 The long arm statute of a forum state
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Pennoyer gave states exclusive jurisdiction
over persons and property within state boundaries. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722-23. The Supreme
Court in Pennoyer, however, disallowed the exercise of jurisdiction over persons or property
outside state boundaries. Id. at 723. The Supreme Court in International Shoe changed the
focus of establishing personal jurisdiction from requiring the physical presence of a nonresident
defendant in the forum state to requiring the nonresident to have sufficient contacts with the
forum state. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17. The Supreme Court stated that since due
process requires a nonresident defendant to have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum
state, a court protects nonresident defendants from having to defend suits in distant forum
states in which the nonresident defendant has no meaningful relations. Id. at 319. The sufficient
minimum contacts requirement ensured that maintaining the suit did not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. at 316. The Supreme Court stated that by
assuring an orderly administration of the law, the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment gives the legal system a degree of predictability. Id. The degree of predictability
assured by the due process clause allows potential defendants to structure their primary
activities with some degree of assurance as to where that conduct will render a nonresident
defendant amenable to suit. Id. at 319. The Supreme Court noted that the fourteenth
amendment places two restrictions on a court's jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Id.
The Supreme Court stated that before a court can assert personal jurisdiction, the court must
have power over the defendant to render a valid judgment. Id. The court also must be certain
that the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is reasonable. Id. For a court to
have power over a nonresident defendant to render a valid judgment, the fourteenth amendment
due process clause requires the defendant to have minimum contacts with the forum state
before a court can exercise jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. World-Wide Volkswa-
gen, 444 U.S. at 291-92. In determining whether a court has the power to render a valid
judgment over a nonresident defendant, the court only must focus on the defendant's contacts
with the forum state. Id. at 292-94. For a court to be certain that the exercise of jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant is reasonable, the fourteenth amendment due process clause
requires the court to balance the interests of the defendant, the plaintiff, and the state. World-
Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292-94. The Supreme Court asserted that a court's primary
concern in determining reasonableness is the burden on the nonresident defendant of having
to litigate a claim in a foreign state. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292-94.
3. See, e.g., ALA. R. Csv.P. 4.2 (B)(2)(a)(1984)(Alabama has personal jurisdiction over
any nonresident defendant transacting any business in this state); FLA. STAT. § 48.193(l)(g)(Supp.
1984)(Florida has personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant on cause of action arising
from the breach of a contract in this state by failing to preform acts required by contract);
TEx. Ray. Crv. STAT. ANN. ART. 2031b (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1985)(Texas has personal
jurisdiction over any foreign corporation engaging in business in this state. . .). See Insurance
Corp. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 699 (1982)(discussing sufficiency of defend-
ant's contacts for purposes of allowing jurisdiction within state's long arm statute). In Insurance
Corp. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites, Compagnie Des Bauxites (CB) filed a diversity suit against
twenty-one foreign insurers. Id. at 698. CB claimed that the defendants had failed to honor
an insurance policy that CB had purchased. Id. Before trial, the defendant's asserted that the
court lacked personal jurisdiction within Pennsylvania's long arm statute and, therefore, the
court had no power to adjudicate claims against the defendants. Id. Subsequently, the plaintiff
requested information from the defendants to establish that the court in fact did have
jurisdiction over the defendants within Pennsylvania's long arm statute. Id. After issuing
several orders to compel the defendants to cooperate, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania warned the defendant that failure to cooperate would result
in a sanction. Id at 699. The sanction essentially would presume the existence of the requested
facts, which would establish the existence of personal jurisdiction over the defendants within
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authorizes whether the state can exercise personal jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendant.4 Once the court determines that the long arm statute
grants personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the court must
consider whether the defendant's contacts with the forum state satisfy the
constitutional mandates of due process. 5 Courts, however, disagree as to
due process limits. Id. ; see FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(a) (federal rule of civil procedure provides
that court may sanction party for failure to comply with discovery order). The defendants
continued to refuse to cooperate and the district court asserted the existence of personal
jurisdiction. Compagnie Des Bauxites, 456 U.S. at 698. On appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the jurisdictional holding. Id. at 700. The Third
Circuit contended that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the sanction.
Id. The Third Circuit observed that the district court had evidence of the defendant's failure
to comply with the discovery orders. Id. Additionally, the Third Circuit stated that absent a
showing that the district court was clearly erroneous, the Third Circuit must affirm the district
court's decision. Id. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Compagnie Court
only examined the issue of whether the sanction was proper. Id. at 698. Justice Powell, in a
concurring opinion, stated that the issue was whether the exercise of jurisdiction was within
due process limits and not whether the sanction was proper. Compagnie Des Bauxites, 456
U.S. at 715-16 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell reasoned that the district court could
have imposed personal jurisdiction under Pennsylvania's long arm statute without the pre-
sumption of personal jurisdiction that the sanction established. Id. at 716. Justice Powell
pointed out that the Pennsylvania court had sufficient information about the insurer's contacts
with Pennsylvania to fall within Pennsylvania's long arm statute without the additional facts
sought in discovery. Id. at 717. The Court found that the defendants in fact had sufficient
business activity in Pennsylvania to bring them within the Pennsylvania long arm statute. Id.;
see Wolf v. Richmond County Hospital Authority, 745 F.2d 904,909 (4th Cir. 1984)(discussing
state authorization of jurisdiction over nonresident defendant); Hardy v. Pioneer Parachute
Co., 531 F.2d 193, 195 (4th Cir. 1976)(interpreting and applying forum state's long arm
statute); Bowman v. Curt G. Joa, Inc., 361 F.2d 706, 711 (4th Cir. 1966)(assertion of federal
court's jurisdiction within forum state's long arm statute).
4. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing federal court's authority derived
from long arm statutes).
5. See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2185-87 (1985)(defendant's contacts
with forum state satisfied due process limit on assertion of personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendant). In Burger King v. Rudzewicz, the United States Supreme Court determined what
contacts were important in determining the existence of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant. Id. In Burger King, two Michigan residents inquired about opening a Burger King
franchise in Michigan. Id. at 2179. After sending franchise applications to Burger King's
Michigan district office, the district office forwarded the application to Burger King's head-
quarters in Miami, Florida. Id. After four months of negotiations, the parties began to argue
over certain contract provisions. Id. The Michigan franchisees negotiated with both the
Michigan district office and the Miami headquarters. Id. at 2178-79. After reaching a com-
promise, the parties signed a final contract establishing the franchise relationship in Florida,
and providing that Florida law governed the franchise relationship. Id. at 2179. The parties
also agreed that the franchisees would send payments to the Miami headquarters. Id. The
agreement provided a twenty year franchise and obligated the Michigan residents to make
franchise payments of over one million dollars. Id. at 2179.
In 1979, the Michigan franchisees defaulted on the required monthly franchise payments
to Burger King. Id. Unable to restructure the outstanding debt or reach a compromise, the
Miami headquarters terminated the franchise relationship and demanded that the Michigan
franchisees vacate the premises. Id. at 2180. The Michigan franchisees disregarded the franchise
termination and continued to operate the franchise. Id. Burger King subsequently initiated suit
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what constitutes sufficient contacts with a forum state under the due process
clause. 6 Courts especially disagree as to what contacts are necessary to
satisfy the due process requirement of sufficient contacts in situations in
which a single contract is the nonresident defendant's only contact with the
forum state. 7 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
recently considered the contacts necessary to establish specific jurisdiction
in a contract case. 8 In Chung v. Nana Development Corporation.,9 the
Fourth Circuit held that a mere contract without other contacts was insuf-
ficient to establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. 10
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida for breach of contract
and trademark infringement. Id. The district court asserted jurisdiction over the Michigan
defendant. Id.
The district court in Burger King found that the defendants had breached the franchise
agreement and infringed on Burger King's trademark. Burger King v. MacShara, 724 F.2d
1505, 1508 (11th Cir. 1984), rev'd sub nom. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (1985).
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the finding
of the district court and held that although the defendants were within the reach of Florida's
long arm statute, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendants would offend
fundamental fairness. Id. Burger King appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals to the
United States Supreme Court. Burger King, 105 S.Ct. at 2181.
The Supreme Court dismissed Burger King's appeal because the Court was uncertain
whether the Eleventh Circuit had declared the Florida long arm statute unconstitutional on its
face or merely in its application in this particular case. Id. The Supreme Court, however,
treated the personal jurisdiction issue as a petition for certiorari, granted the petition, and
reversed. Id. The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit and upheld
the district court's assertion of jurisdiction over the Michigan defendants. Id. at 2180-81. The
Supreme Court in Burger King stated that due process requires a nonresident defendant to
have meaningful contacts or relations with a forum state before a forum state court can assert
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Id. 2181-82. Additionally, the Burger King
Court stated that to comport with the constitutional mandates of due process, a court must
establish that the nonresident defendant purposely directed activities toward the forum state.
Id. at 2182.
6. See Burger King, 105 S.Ct. at 2190 (allowing court to exercise personal jurisdiction
in contract case in which defendant had contacts other than mere contract); Beck v. Spindler,
256 Minn. 543, 549, 99 N.W.2d 670, 678 (1959) (determining that nonresident corporation
engaging in single contact with forum state was amenable to suit for damages arising out of
contract).
7. See In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 236 (6th Cir.
1972)(upholding personal jurisdiction when corporation entered into contract and corporation
knew that manufacturer was located in forum state); cf. Brown v. Florida Keys Aqueduct
Auth., 614 F.Supp 87, 93 (1985)(granting motion to dismiss when defendant entered into
agreement with agent and defendant knew agent was located in forum state).
8. See Chung v. Nana Development Co., 783 F.2d at 1128-30 (court determined that
single contract insufficient to allow personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant within
limits of due process); infra notes 11-43 and accompanying text (discussing Chung); infra notes
70-81 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's application of considerations Supre,me
Court established to determine personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in contract
cases).
9. 783 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1986).
10. See Chung v. Nana Development Corp., 783 F.2d 1124, 1129-30 (4th Cir. 1986)(holding
that mere contract insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction within due process limits);
infra notes 70-81 and accompanying text (discussing factors court considered in disallowing
personal jurisdiction in Chung).
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In Chung an Alaska corporation, Nana Development Corporation (Nana),
sold to Choon Young Chung, a resident of Virginia, frozen reindeer antlers."
Before purchasing the frozen reindeer antlers, Chung initiated dealings with
Nana in May 1982 by telephoning Nana's Alaska office. 2 After negotiating
with Chung, Nana offered to sell Chung 500 pounds of frozen reindeer
antlers. 3 As a condition of the offer, Nana insisted that Chung accept
delivery of the antlers in Nome, Alaska14. Chung agreed to the condition."
Chung traveled to Alaska to accept delivery of the frozen reindeer antlers
at the agreed price. 16 Nana, however, could only deliver 120 pounds of
frozen antlers. 7 Chung agreed to accept less than the number of antlers
upon which Chung and Nana had agreed, provided that Nana subsequently
fulfill the terms of the agreement.'8 To fulfill the obligation to supply to
Chung 500 pounds of antlers, Nana agreed to deliver 380 pounds of frozen
reindeer antlers to Chung in Virginia the next day. 19 Chung, therefore, paid
$17,500 as the agreed price for 500 pounds of antlers. 20 On June 15, Nana
contracted with an air carrier to deliver 380 pounds of frozen antlers to
Virginia. 2' When the shipment arrived in Virginia on June 18, Chung went
to the airport to pick up the antlers.22 Chung arrived at the airport and
discovered that the antlers had thawed during shipment.2Y The lack of
refrigeration rendered the antlers unusable.2 Moreover, neither Chung nor
Nana had insured the shipment, and the carrier offered reimbursement of
only $190 for the 380 pounds of antlers which had cost Chung $13,300.2
Chung, therefore, sustained substantial monetary loss. 26
11. Chung, 783 F.2d at 1125-26. The Chung court noted that Nana's principal place of
business was in Anchorage, Alaska. Id. at 1125. The Chung court further noted that Nana
sold reindeer antlers to processors who sent the antlers to the Orient after processing. Id. at
1125 n.1.
12. Chung, 783 F.2d at 1125.
13. Id. The Chung court stated that John Schaeffer of Nana told Chung that Chung
could purchase 500 pounds of frozen reindeer antlers at $35.00 per pound. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1125-26.
17. Chung, 783 F.2d at 1126. The Chung court noted that Chung and Nana originally
contemplated that after payment Nana would deliver the entire 500 pounds of frozen reindeer
antlers to Chung in Alaska. Id. Due to unexpected delays, Nana only delivered 120 pounds
of frozen antlers. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. Chung paid for the frozen reindeer antlers at the time of sale with a certified





25. Id. The Chung court observed that the carrier offered to pay Chung only $.50 per
pound. Id.
26. Id. The Chung court stated that Chung's loss totaled $8,207. Id.
[Vol. 44:505
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To recover the balance of his loss, Chung instituted an action against
Nana in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia.27 The district court found personal jurisdiction over Nana in Virginia.
28
After establishing personal jurisdiction over Nana, the district court deter-
mined that Nana had a duty to insure the shipment of frozen reindeer
antlers and awarded Chung $8,207 in damages. 29 Asserting that the district
court of Virginia lacked personal jurisdiction over Nana, Nana appealed
the judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.30
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district
court.3' The Fourth Circuit used a two step analysis in considering whether
Nana had maintained sufficient contacts with Virginia to support the federal
district court's exercise of in personam jurisdiction over Nana. 32 The Fourth
Circuit first examined the language of Virginia's long arm statute to establish
that the statute provided the district court authority to assert jurisdiction
over the defendant.3 3 The Chung court found that Virginia's long arm
statute conferred personal jurisdiction over any person contracting to do
business with a Virginia resident. 34 Additionally, the Chung court noted that
the Fourth Circuit consistently has construed the Virginia long arm statute
to assert jurisdiction to the extent that due process allows. 3 The Chung
court found that Virginia law and due process analysis were identical with
respect to the required amount of a nonresident defendant's contacts with
the forum state to establish jurisdiction. 36 The Chung court, therefore,






32. Id. at 1126-30.
33. Id. at 1127 n.2; see VA. CODE §8.01-328.1(1983). Section 8.01-328.1 of the Virginia
Code provides that: "A. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts
directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from a person: *
2. Contracting to supply services or things in this Commonwealth;
VA. CODE §8.01-328.1 (1983).
In Chung, the Fourth Circuit based federal jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship. Chung,
783 F.2d at 1127. The district court found that Nana contracted to supply "things" in Virginia,
within the meaning of Virginia Code section 8.01-328.1A2. Chung, 783 F.2d at 1127 n.2; VA.
CODE §8.01-328.1 (1983). The Chung court, therefore, concluded that Virginia's long arm
statute conferred jurisdiction upon the court. Chung, 783 F.2d at 1127 n.2.
34. Chung, 783 F.2d at 1127 n.2; see VA. CODE 8.01-328.1 (1983) (relevant provision of
Virginia's long arm statute).
35. Chung, 783'F.2d at 1127; see Brown v. Am. Broadcasting Co., 704 F.2d 1296, 1301
(4th Cir. 1983)(construing that Virginia's long arm statute is limited by due process); Peanut
Corp. v. Hollywood Brands, Inc., 696 F.2d 311, 313 (4th Cir. 1982)(purpose of Virginia's
long arm statute is to permit court assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to limits of
due process).
36. Chung, 783 F.2d at 1127 n.2.
37. Id. at 1127.
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In determining the limits of due process on in personam jurisdiction,
the Fourth Circuit reviewed several recent Supreme Court decisions to
determine whether Nana's contacts with Virginia satisfied the requirements
of due process.18 The Chung court observed that Chung went beyond the
boundaries of Virginia and initiated dealings with Nana in Alaska.3 9 Addi-
tionally, the Chung court contended that Nana's response to Chung's
solicitation was not a purposeful effort to develop a market for antlers in
Virginia, but a response to Chung's unsolicited inquiry.4° The Chung court
also considered significant that the relationship between Nana and Chung
was a single contractual relationship and not a continuous relationship.
4
1
After reviewing Nana's contacts with Virginia, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over Nana violated due process
limitations. 42
Although agreeing with the majority's determination that a mere contract
may be insufficient to establish general jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant, the dissent in Chung contended that a single contract may suffice
to establish specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.43 The dissent
38. Id. at 1126-30; see Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (1985) (setting forth
due process prerequisites to courts exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant
in contract cases); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98 (1980) (refining International
Shoe's minimum contacts requirement); International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17 (1945) (estab-
lishing minimum contacts required for determining court's exercise of personal jurisdiction
within due process limits); see also infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text (discussing
Supreme Court's recent pronouncement of sufficient contacts and due process requirements of
personal jurisdiction).
39. Chung, 783 F.2d at 1128.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.; see supra notes 10-36 (discussing Chung); infra notes 70-85 and accompanying
text (discussing minimum contacts Fourth Circuit deems necessary in contract cases to establish
jurisdiction over nonresident defendant within due process limits).
43. Chung, 783 F.2d at 1130 (Ervin, J., dissenting). The dissent in Chung examined the
relationship between Nana and Chung and concluded that Nana and Chung had two contractual
agreements. Id. at 1131. The first agreement was Nana's promise to deliver 500 pounds of
antlers to Chung in Alaska. Id. The dissent in Chung recognized that if Nana had fulfilled
the first obligation with Chung, Nana's fortuitous contacts with Virginia would not support
jurisdiction. Id. at 1131. Since Nana could only deliver 120 pounds of antlers to Chung in
Alaska, however, the dissent contended that Nana entered a second agreement to deliver 380
pounds of antlers to Chung in Virginia the next day. Id. The dissent in Chung reasoned that
in making the second agreement, Nana purposefully and knowingly availed itself of the rights
and privileges of shipping goods to a Virginia resident. Id. The dissent in Chung stated that
Nana's contacts with Virginia could not support a Virginia court's jurisdiction over Nana for
claims not arising out of Nana's contacts with Virginia. Id. at 1130. The dissent, however,
contended that Nana's contacts with Virginia were sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction
over claims arising out of NANA's contacts with Virginia. Id.
The majority in Chung declined to accept the dissent's argument and stated that fairness
requires a court to examine a nonresident defendant's contacts as a whole. Id. at 1129. The
majority in Chung contended that for a court in Virginia to establish personal jurisdiction,
the nonresident defendant's conduct and connection with Virginia must be such that the
nonresident defendant reasonably should expect to be haled into court in Virginia. Id. at 1129
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argued that the majority erred by failing to recognize the distinction between
specific and general jurisdiction. 4 The dissent contended that contacts that
a court deems insufficient to establish general jurisdiction often are sufficient
to allow a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.45
The dissent in Chung recognized that in exercising general jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant, a court does not have to find that the claim
against the defendant arose out of the defendant's contacts with the forum
state.4 6 Rather, the court only must find that the defendant's contacts with
the forum state are continuous and systematic.47 The dissent, however,
stated that specific jurisdiction allows a court to adjudicate claims arising
out of or related to the nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum
state.48 The dissent, therefore, concluded that in the present case, Nana had
established sufficient contacts with Virginia to permit specific jurisdiction
within due process limits.4 9 The dissent, therefore, contended that the
majority erred by applying the continuous and systematic test for general
jurisdiction to Chung which was a specific jurisdiction case. 0 The dissent
in Chung, therefore, would have held that the district court had personal
jurisdiction over Nana."
Although the majority and dissent disagreed as to whether Nana had
sufficient contacts, the majority and dissent agreed that the decision to
establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant must comport
with the due process standard as enunciated by the United States Supreme
n.3. The majority further contended that the contacts between Nana and Virginia were not
purposeful to the extent that Nana reasonably could have foreseen litigation in Virginia. Id.
at 1129.




48. Id. The dissent in Chung noted that Nana only needed fair warning that a particular
act may subject Nana to jurisdiction of a foreign court. See id. at 1130 (citing Burger King)
The dissent contended that fair warning existed when Nana purposefully directed activities to
Virginia by shipping the antlers to Virginia. Id. The dissent further asserted that the litigation
between Nana and Chung resulted from injuries arising out of Nana's shipment of goods to
Virginia. Id.
49. Id. at 1132. The Fourth Circuit dissent in Chung contended that Nana purposely
had directed activities to Virginia and thus, had satisfied the minimum contact requirement.
Id. Additionally, the dissent in Chung contended that once the nonresident defendant satisfied
the minimum contacts requirement, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant must comport with fair play and substantial justice. Id. The dissent in Chung found
that Nana purposefully entered into an agreement to ship frozen antlers to Virginia, and that
Nana profited from the shipment. Id. at 1130. Additionally, the dissent in Chung asserted
that Nana could have foreseen and easily taken steps to avoid litigation in Virginia. Id. The
dissent, therefore, concluded that Nana satisfied the minimum contacts requirement and that
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Nana comported with fair play and substantial justice.
Id.
50. Id.; see Helicoptores Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8 (describing
specific jurisdiction analysis).
51. Chung, 783 F.2d at 1130.
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Court in International Shoe.5 2 The majority, however, contended that the
minimum contacts standard that the Supreme Court established in Inter-
national Shoe applied when the Fourth Circuit determined that the exercise
of personal jurisdiction was within due process limits. 53 The dissent in
Chung, in contrast, relied on International Shoe only after concluding that
Nana had met the minimum contacts requirement and not as part of the
minimum contacts standard. 54 In International Shoe, the Supreme Court
held that a court could subject a nonresident defendant to the court's
jurisdiction if the defendant had sufficient contacts with the forum state. 5
Noting inconsistency among lower courts as to what constituted sufficient
contacts with a forum state, the Supreme Court in International Shoe
enunciated several factors that courts should consider in determining whether
to subject a nonresident defendant to in personam jurisdiction.5 6 The Su-
preme Court in International Shoe suggested that a court should considex
whether the nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum state were
continuous and systematic,57 and whether the contacts were related to the
subject matter of the litigation.5 The Court in International Shoe also
decided that a court should consider the inconvenience to a nonresident
defendant of defending in a foreign state to ensure that maintaining the
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 9
Although the Supreme Court emphasized the factors that courts should
consider in determining the existence of minimum contacts in jurisdictional
questions involving the sufficiency of a nonresident defendant's contacts
with the forum state, the Supreme Court recently examined whether the
contacts confer on a court specific or general jurisdiction. 0 In Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall,61 the United States Supreme Court em-
phasized the difference between specific and general jurisdiction. 62 The
52. Id. at 1126, 1132.
53. Chung, 783 F.2d at 1126-30.
54. Id. at 1130.
55. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
56. See id. at 316-317 (changing personal jurisdiction focus from physical presence to
minimum contacts requirement). In International Shoe, the United States Supreme Court
clearly stated that a nonresident defendant must have sufficient contacts with a forum state




60. See infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text (discussing Helicoptores and Burger
King in distinguishing between specific and general jurisdiction).
61. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
62. Id. at 409-13. In Helicopteros Nacioneles de Colombia v. Hall, the United States
Supreme Court held that the defendant's contacts with the forum state were insufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction without violating due process limits. Id. at 418-19. The defendant
was a Colombian corporation with its principal place of business in Bogata, Colombia. Id. at
409. Helicol was in the business of providing helicopter transportation for oil and construction
companies in South America. Id. In January 1976, one of Helicol's helicopters crashed in
Peru. Id. at 410. The plane crash killed four United States citizens. Id. Although the decedents
[Vol. 44:505
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Supreme Court in Helicopteros stated that in cases of specific jurisdiction,
courts violate the constitutional mandates of due process by exercising
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in claims unrelated to the nonres-
ident defendant's contacts. 63 The Court, however, added that in general
jurisdiction cases, in which the claims related to a nonresident defendant's
contacts were sufficient to establish jurisdiction, the constitutional mandates
of due process permitted the exercise of jurisdiction over claims unrelated
to the nonresident defendant's contacts.
6 4
were not Texas residents, the decedents were employees of Consorcio. Id. A Texas joint
venture formed Consorcio which was a Peruvian business association created for the purpose
of constructing an oil pipeline in Peru. Id. Helicol contracted with Consorcio and the Texas
joint venture to provide helicopter transportation for the pipeline project. Id. Additionally,
Helicol had negotiated the transportation contract in Houston. Id. The Texas joint venture
and Consorcio paid Helicol with payments drawn on a Houston bank. Id. Helicol purchased
many helicopters from Bell Helicopter in Fort Worth and Bell Helicopter trained many of
Helicol's pilots and personnel. Id. at 411 After the crash, the decedents' estates brought suit
in Texas. Id. at 412. Asserting that the Texas court lacked personal jurisdiction, Helicol moved
to dismiss the action. Id. The district court of Harris County, Texas, dismissed Helicol's
motion to dismiss and entered a judgment against Helicol. Id. Claiming that the district court
lacked personal jurisdiction, Helicol appealed the district court's judgement. Id. On appeal,
the Texas Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the district court and held that the
district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Helicol. Id. On appeal, the Texas Supreme
Court initially affirmed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals. Id. On a motion for
rehearing, however, the court withdrew its prior opinion and reversed the holding of the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals. Id. Ruling that the Texas courts had personal jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendant, the Texas Supreme Court held that the Texas long arm statute reached
as far as due process allowed. Id. at 413. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the
defendant claimed that the courts exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant was
inconsistent with due process limits. Id. at 413. The Supreme Court analyzed the requirements
of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Id. The Supreme Court distinguished
between specific and general jurisdiction. Id. at 414. The Court noted that when a state
exercised jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a suit arising out of the nonresident
defendant's contacts with the forum state, the state is exercising specific jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendant. Id. at 414 n. 8. The Court further noted that when a state asserted
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a suit unrelated to the nonresident defendant's
contacts with the forum state, the state is exercising general jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant. Id. at 414 n. 9; see Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 786 (1976)(distinguishing claims
arising out of defendant's contacts with forum state and claims unrelated to defendant's
contacts with forum state). See generally, Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process
Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 S.CT. REv. 77, 80-81(discussing due process
limits on state's exercise of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants).
63. Helicoptores, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8-9. The United States Supreme Court in Helicoptores
stated that when a controversy is related or arises out of a defendant's contacts with the
forum state, the court must find a relation between the defendant, the forum state, and the
litigation to satisfy fundamental notions of fair play and substantial justice. Id. at 414; Keeton
v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984) (discussing differences in specific and general
jurisdiction); supra note 62 and accompanying text (distinguishing between specific and general
jurisdiction).
64. Helicoptores, 466 U.S. at 414. The Supreme Court in Helicoptores stated that
although the controversy is unrelated or does not arise out of a defendant's contacts with the
forum state, a forum state does not offend due process if the defendant has sufficient contacts
with the forum state. Id.; see supra note 62 and accompanying text (noting distinction between
specific and general jurisdiction).
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Additionally, the United States Supreme Court in distinguishing between
specific and general jurisdiction held in Burger King v. Rudzewicz6 s that to
establish specific jurisdiction in contract cases a court must find that a
nonresident defendant deliberately reached beyond the boundaries of his
state and negotiated with a resident of the forum state.6 The Burger King
Court emphasized that when a court seeks to assert that a contract was the
basis of jurisdiction, a court must examine factors such as prior negotiations,
substantial and continuous relationship, and actual course of dealings in
determining whether the defendant purposefully established sufficient con-
tacts with the forum state.6 7 The Court stated, however, that a nonresident
defendant must have contacts in addition to a mere contract to confer
specific jurisdiction on the forum state.
6 8
In determining the court's exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant in a contract case, the Fourth Circuit majority in Chung correctly
relied on the Burger King analysis because Nana's only contact with Virginia
was a single contract. 69 The Fourth Circuit majority, therefore, applied a
specific jurisdiction analysis because Chung's claim arose out of Nana's
contact with Virginia. 70 Even though the Chung majority did not articulate
the distinction between specific and general jurisdiction, the Chung majority
recognized that Chung's claim against Nana arose out of Nana's contacts
with Virginia. 7' The dissent, therefore, erred by contending that the Fourth
Circuit majority in Chung applied a general jurisdiction analysis. 72 Recog-
nizing that a single contract was the basis for Chung's claim against Nana,
the Chung majority correctly applied a specific jurisdiction analysis. 73
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit in Chung correctly held that a mere
contract without other contacts was not sufficient to establish specific
jurisdiction.74 Since the Fourth Circuit determined that Virginia's long arm
statute extended as far as due process allowed, the Fourth Circuit correctly
focused on the due process limits in considering the contacts that the statute
required to satisfy jurisdictional requirements. 75 In determining the contacts
65. 105 S.Ct 2174 (1985).
66. Burger King, 105 S.Ct. at 2179; see supra note 6 (discussion of Burger King).
67. Id. at 2186; see supra note 5 and accompanying text (factual discussion of Burger
King).
68. Burger King, 105 S.Ct. at 2179.
69. Chung, 783 F.2d at 1126-30.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1129. Although the Fourth Circuit did not articulate the distinction between
specific and general jurisdiction, the Fourth Circuit examined the factors important to estab-
lishing specific jurisdiction Id.; see supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text (discussing factors
courts consider in determining existence of jurisdiction over nonresident defendant).
72. Chung, 783 F.2d at 1130.
73. Id. at 1126-30.
74. Id. at 1126-27; see infra notes 75-81 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit's
reasoning in finding lack of jurisdiction over nonresident defendant).
75. See Chung, 783 F.2d at 1125 (concluding minimum contacts were lacking and,
therefore, due process barred court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defend-
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that are necessary to establish personal jurisdiction within the limitations
of due process, the Fourth Circuit recognized that in cases in which a
contract is the nonresident's only contact 'with the forum state, the contract
must have a substantial connection with the forum state.7 6 Accordingly, the
Chung court examined prior contractual negotiations between Nana and
Chung. 77 In determining the significance of the prior negotiations, the Fourth
Circuit emphasized the fact that Chung initiated communication with Nana
in Alaska.7 8 The Fourth Circuit also indicated that Nana's response to
Chung's solicitation was not a purposeful effort to develop a market for
reindeer antlers in Virginia, but rather a response to an unsolicited inquiry.7 9
In further examining Nana's contacts with Virginia, the Fourth Circuit
observed the relationship between Nana and Chung to determine if Nana
and Chung had established a continuing relationship or whether Nana and
Chung's relationship was merely an isolated transaction. 0 After reviewing
the record, the Fourth Circuit found that there existed no continuing
relationship between Nana and Chung beyond the formation of the con-
tract. " Next, the Fourth Circuit considered the forum in which Chung and
Nana had finalized the contract.8 2 Since Chung paid for the antlers in Alaska
at the time of sale, the court concluded that the parties had finalized the
contract in Alaska."3 The Fourth Circuit further concluded that the contract
between Nana and Chung was an isolated and unsolicited transaction. 4 The
Chung court, therefore, correctly held that Nana's contacts with Virginia
were insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction within the constitutional
mandates of due process.85 In holding that Nana's contacts were insufficient
to satisfy the constitutional mandates of due process, the Fourth Circuit in
ant); Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 723 (due process limitations on personal jurisdiction); supra notes
33-43 and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit's analysis in Chung of contacts required to satisfy
due process limits on personal jurisdiction in contract cases); see also Burger King, 105 S. Ct.
at 2183 (establishing court's legitimate exercise of in personain jurisdiction in contract cases);
World-Wide Volkswagen, 326 U.S. at 310 (analyzing due process limitations and requirements);
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (creating prerequisites of establishing personal jurisdiction
to satisfy due process requirements).
76. Chung, 783 F.2d at 1126.
77. Id. at 1128.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.; see supra notes 11-33 and accompanying text (discussing facts of Chung).
81. Chung, 783 F.2d at 1127-28.
82. Id. at 1128.
83. Id. The Chung court recognized, however, that even though the parties finalized the
contract in Alaska, Chung and Nana negotiated the essential terms of the contract over the
telephone between Alaska and Virginia and, therefore, the contract negotiations did not satisfy
the minimum contacts standard. Id. The court emphasized that Chung initiated the commu-
nications between Nana and Chung. Id.
84. Id. (concluding that contract and shipment of goods in Chung were not purposeful
sufficiently to render Nana subject to personal jurisdiction).
85. Id. at 1130; see supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's
reasoning in Chung disallowing personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant).
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Chung correctly recognized that a forum maintains two primary interests
with respect to the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant.8 6 First, the forum recognizes and wants to protect the constitu-
tional rights that due process affords a nonresident defendant in defending
claims in a foreign state.8 7 Additionally, the forum has a substantial interest
in allowing citizens of the forum state to have a convenient forum in which
to assert claims.88 The Chung majority upheld the forum state's interest in
protecting Nana's constitutional right of having to defend against claims in
Virginia by examining Nana's contacts with Virginia. 89 The Chung majority
upheld the forum state's interest by concluding that Nana's contacts were
insufficient to allow the Virginia court to exercise personal jurisdiction
within due process limits. 90 The Chung majority, however, recognized that
the state's interest in allowing citizens of Virginia to have a convenient
forum in which to assert claims must yield when the assertion of personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant would violate due process. 91
The decision of the Fourth Circuit in Chung gives practitioners a more
clear idea of the contacts that a practitioner must demonstrate to a court
in a contract case before a court can assert jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant. 92 In contract cases, Fourth Circuit practitioners should examine
the long arm statute of the forum state to determine if the state court has
the authority to hear a claim against a nonresident defendant. 93 If the long
arm statute authorizes jurisdiction on a court, then the court may hear the
claim against the nonresident defendant. 94 To determine whether a court
may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant within the limits of
due process, the court will perform an analysis of the nonresident defend-
86. Chung, 783 F.2d at 1128 (discussing state's interest in state's exercise of personal
jurisdiction over nonresident defendant).
87. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98 (noting due process limitations and
requirements imposed on a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction within due process limits);
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (creating prerequisites of minimum contacts to satisfy due
process requirements).
88. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (noting that minimum contact requirement
ensures due process protection).
89. Chung, 783 F.2d at 1128.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Chung, 783 F.2d at 1127; see supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text (reasoning
by which Supreme Court in Burger King established federal court's jurisdiction in contract
cases over nonresident defendant); notes 70-81 and accompanying text (reasoning by which
Fourth Circuit in Chung established lack of personal jurisdiction).
93. See supra text accompanying note 3 (state long arm statute conferring upon courts
authority to exercise jurisdiction); text accompanying note 3 (long arm statute provides federal
courts with authority to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendant).
94. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (limitations that due process imposed on
court's ability to assert personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant); notes 66-69 and
accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's approach in determining sufficiency of contacts
in contract cases).
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ant's contacts with the forum state.95 If the plaintiff's claim against the
nonresident defendant relates to or arises out of the nonresident defendant's
contacts with the forum state, the practitioner should anticipate that the
court will perform a specific jurisdiction analysis to determine if the exercise
of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant is within due process
limits. 96 In determining whether a court can exercise specific jurisdiction
within due process limits, practitioners should determine whether the con-
tract has a substantial connection with the forum state.9 To determine
whether a contract has a substantial connection with the forum state,
practitioners should follow the guidelines that the Supreme Court set forth
in Burger King.9 The Supreme Court's guidelines in Burger King require
the court in contract cases to consider the location of prior negotiations,
the initiator of the negotiations, and a defendant's purposeful effort to
enter a forum.9 Practitioners also should look at the contract and determine
if the contract establishes a substantial and continuous relationship between
a nonresident defendant and the forum state. °0 If, however, the nonresident
defendant's contacts with the forum state are substantial, a practitioner
should anticipate that a court will apply a general jurisdiction analysis. 101
Practitioners should realize that if the court asserts general jurisdiction over




The Chung decision advises Fourth Circuit attorneys that personal ju-
risdiction over a nonresident defendant in a contract case requires a court
to establish that the contract that forms the basis of the jurisdictional claim
has a substantial connection with the forum state.10 a Chung, however,
requires more than a showing of the existence of a mere contract between
95. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (establishing minimum contact requirement
limiting court's exercise of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants); supra notes 65-68 and
accompanying text (discussing Burger King analysis of significant factors in establishing
jurisdiction in contract cases).
96. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussion of specific jurisdiction).
97. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (imposition of limits on due process imposes
on court's ability to assert personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant); notes 66-69 and
accompanying text (discussing factors that limit a court's ability to exercise personal jurisdic-
tion).
98. See text accompanying supra notes 65-68 (establishing personal jurisdiction analysis
in contract cases).
99. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text (discussing important factors in
determining personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant in contract cases); notes 33-43
and accompanying text (Fourth Circuit analysis in Chung establishing lack of personal juris-
diction).
100. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (additional circumstances court's should
consider in justifying personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in contract cases).
101. See supra note 62 (discussing general jurisdiction).
102. Id.
103. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (due process limits a court's ability to assert
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant); notes 65-68 and accompanying text (Supreme
Court's approach in determining sufficiency of contacts in contract cases).
1987]
